

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SS-15 NSC-10 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12

TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12 AEC-11

RSR-01 /149 W

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R 181920 Z APR 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9804

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2886

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1955

E. O. 11652: GDS 12/31/81

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, MOPS, SP, NO

SUBJ: DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING APRIL 18, 1973- PROPOSED
VISIT BY NAVAL ON- CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN TO SPAIN

REF: STATE 72011 NOTAL

BEGIN SUMMARY: DPC DEFERRED DECISION ON SUBJECT TO ALLOW
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TIME TO CONSULT WITH FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT DURING WEEK FOLLOWING EASTER HOLIDAYS.
NORWAY HOPES TO HAVE ANSWER BY MAY 1. END SUMMARY.

1. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS INTRODUCED SUBJECT, CITING SACEUR
AND MILITARY COMMITTEE SUPPORT FOR VISIT AS REFLECTED IN
MCM-28-73. LT GEN READ (DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
STAFF) THEN MADE TWO POINTS: FIRST, THERE WAS SIGNIFI-
CANT SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF APRIL,
INCLUDING THE MOSKVA AND A NUMBER OF SUBMARINES OPERATING IN THE
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TYRRHENIAN SEA, OFF CORSICA, AND OFF THE SPANISH COAST OPPOSITE
BARCELONA. SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS HAVE MADE FIVE CALLS TO PORTS

INCLUDING ONE IN YUGOSLAVIA, TANGIER AND ANNABA WHILE THE NAVOCFORMED HAS MADE NO TO NON- NATO PORTS. WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY, THE RELEASE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND PRESENTED TO THE DPC FOR REVIEW EARLY NEXT WEEK IN THE USUAL WAY. SECONDLY, THIS WILL BE THE SIXTH ACTIVATION FOR NAV-OCFORMED SINCE ITS FORMATION IN 1969 AND THE FOURTH OCCASION FOR A VISIT TO A NON- NATO PORT. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST TIME DURING ANY OF THE SIX ACTIVATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN; IN THE PAST, THE FORCE OPERATED IN THE EAST AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THERE IS A NEED FOR NATO TO OPERATE THERE TOO.

2. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) INQUIRED IF THIS WOULD BE A ROUTINE VISIT, SINCE IT APPEARED FROM LAST WEEK' S MEETING THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO APPROVE IF IT WERE. LUNS REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. BUSCH (NORWAY) QUESTIONED ROUTINE NATURE SINCE THIS WAS FOURTH ATTEMPT TO GET APPROVAL TO VISIT A NON- NATO PORT. LUNS RESPONDED THAT THE CHARACTER OF THE VISIT IS ROUTINE. SPIERENBURG, SUPPORTED BY CATALANO (ITALY), ASKED THAT IT BE INDICATED MORE CLEARLY IN THE MCM THAT THIS WAS INDEED A ROUTINE VISIT.

3. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT. BEGIN QUOTE.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I APPRECIATE THE STATEMENTS SUPPLIED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SACEUR.

AS WE ALL KNOW, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN ADVOCATING A VISIT BY THE NAVAL ON- CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN TO BARCELONA DURING THE FORCE' S NEXT ACTIVATION, IN MAY AND JUNE OF THIS YEAR. I WILL REVIEW MY GOVERNMENT' S RATIONALE FOR URGING SUCH A VISIT.

OUR APPROACH TO THIS QUITE MODEST ACTION IS BASED ON THREE BASIC CALCULATIONS:

- FIRST, THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK IS CRITICAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE;
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- SECOND, IT IS ESSENTIAL, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE AND PERSISTENT PROGRAM OF MEASURES TO COUNTER SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN;

- THIRD, SPAIN OCCUPIES A KEY STRATEGIC POSITION ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK. IT EXISTS. ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION IS WELL KNOWN. A CALCULATION OF INTEREST REQUIRES THE US TO SEEK AND TO MAINTAIN COOPERATION WITH SPAIN IN MILITARY AFFAIRS FOR ALLIED SECURITY AND WE DO SO.

I WILL ELABORATE BRIEFLY.

THE FIRST POINT, THAT THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK IS CRITICAL TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, IS SELF- EVIDENT. I BELIEVE IT IS ACCEPTED BY EACH NATION IN THE ALLIANCE.

AS TO THE SECOND POINT, SOME RECENT HISTORY MAY BE INSTRUCTIVE.

-- THE CONCEPT OF AN ALLIED NAVAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, CAPABLE OF BEING ON CALL, WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE BY DPC MINISTERS IN JANUARY 1969. THE FORCE WAS DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND TO CARRY OUT SURVEILLANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE FORCE WAS INITIALLY ACTIVATED IN APRIL 1970.

-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION AT THE 46 TH MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION ON MAY 12, 1970, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, ON DECEMBER 1, 1970, FORWARDED ITS REPORT (MCM-85-70) TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON " MEASURES TO COUNTER SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA". THAT PAPER, INCLUDED, AS ONE OF ITS MEASURES, THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO GOOD- WILL VISITS BY THE NAVAL ON- CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN TO NON- NATO NATIONS. MCM-85-70 WAS NOTED BY THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION IN APRIL 1971. ON MAY 28, 1971, DPC MINISTERS NOTED A REPORT BY THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION WHICH INCLUDED THIS RECOMMENDATION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1955

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN THE OPINION OF THE US GOVERNMENT, THOSE DECISIONS BY OUR MINISTERS REMAIN VALID.

AS TO THE THIRD POINT, IT IS AN INESCAPABLE GEOGRAPHIC FACT THAT THE IBERIAN PENINSULA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITS ATLANTIC APPROACHES. THIS IS SO FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

-- SPAIN PROVIDES TO THE UNITED STATES THE BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION THAT ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT, ONE OF THE PILLARS OF NATO' S STRATEGY.

-- SPAIN COMMANDS ACCESS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH WHICH A SIZEABLE PORTION OF THE ALLIANCE' S SHIPPING, TO INCLUDE POL SUPPLIES, FLOW.

-- THE SPANISH AIRCRAFT AND WARNING NET IS TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH NADGE, THUS PROVIDING RADAR COVERAGE FOR THE SECRET

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ALLIANCE ALONG ITS SOUTHERN BORDERS.

TO SUM UP, THERE IS NO WAY OF PREDICTING WITH ACCURACY THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, EITHER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES OR WITH RESPECT TO THE STABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS IN THAT REGION. WHAT IS VERY CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THAT WE MUST MARSHALL AND DEVELOP THE ASSETS AVAILABLE IN THE AREA AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF NATO' S SOUTHERN REGION AND AS A CONTRIBUTION IN THE LONGER TERM TO THE SECURITY OF EACH MEMBER OF THIS ALLIANCE.

IN LAST WEEK' S DPC MEETING, THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL ALLUDED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT WAS DISAPPROVED BY THE DPC LAST APRIL, FOR VISITS BY THE NAVAL ON- CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN TO SPLIT, YUGOSLAVIA AND TUNIS, TUNISIA. I HAVE REVIEWED THE RECORD OF THAT DPC MEETING AND FIND TWO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAST YEAR' S CASE AND THE ONE BEFORE US TODAY:

FIRST, THERE WAS NO SINGLE OBJECTOR TO LAST YEAR' S VISIT PROPOSAL. INSTEAD, THERE WERE OBJECTIONS FROM AT LEAST FOUR ALLIES.

SECONDLY, THE CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO DISAPPROVAL FOCUSED ON THE COUNTRIES TO BE VISITED AND NOT THE OBJECTING COUNTRIES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MOST NATIONS OF THIS ALLIANCE CARRY ON

CONSIDERABLE COMMERCIAL TRADE WITH NON- NATO NATIONS-- INCLUDING SPAIN-- AND THE PROBLEMS FOR THOSE NATIONS' SENSITIVITIES SEEM NOT TO BE GREAT. MOST NATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF CITIZENS WHO VISIT SPAIN AS TOURISTS EACH YEAR. SOME NATIONS OF THIS ALLIANCE HAVE SPANIARDS WHO HAVE COME TO WORK IN THEIR LABOR FORCE, I BELIEVE THAT SECURITY INTERESTS SHOULD BE RANKED AT LEAST AS HIGH AS TRADE AND TOURISM IN STATUS.

I WOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE-- IN CLOSING- THAT THE DPC CAN SEE ITS WAY THROUGH TO TAKE THIS STEP- WHICH WILL BE OF HELP TO THE US, TO BE SURE, IN ITS EFFORTS TO ASSIST IN THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF EUROPE BUT ALSO OF IMPORTANCE TO ALL NATIONS INTERESTED IN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. END QUOTE.

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4. BUSCH SAID HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO ADD TO HIS STATEMENT OF APRIL 13, BUT HE WOULD REPORT NEW INFORMATION TO HIS AUTHORITIES. HIS GOVERNMENT DESIRES TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT DURING THE WEEK FOLLOWING THE EASTER HOLIDAYS.

5. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) THANKED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD FOR HIS STATEMENT OF US POLICY AND MOTIVES, CHARACTERIZING THE US MOTIVATION AS VERY FORCEFUL AND USEFUL, OBJECTIVE, A NEW POINT, AN ARGUMENT WE SHOULD ALL HEED, AND VERY VALID EVEN IF NOT SHARED BY ALL. TO BUSCH HE POINTEDLY REMARKED THAT ALL OF THE DPC EXCEPT NORWAY, EITHER SILENTLY OR OPENLY, SUPPORTED THE VISIT. LUNS AGREED.

6. AT THIS POINT SPIERENBURG EXPRESSED GREAT UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR NORWAY' S ARGUMENT. HE COULD NOT COMPLETELY AGREE WITH THE CONCLUDING PORTION OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD' S STATEMENT. THE TOURISM ARGUMENT CARRIES NO WEIGHT AS FAR AS THE DUTCH ARE CONCERNED. WHILE AGREEING WITH NORWAY IN SOME IF ITS CONCERNS SPIERENBURG SAID HE COULD NOT VETO A ROUTINE VISIT.

7. KRAPF (GERMANY) FULLY SUPPORTED VISIT, NOTING THAT ARGUMENTS BY GEN READ AND AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD STRENGTHENED OPERATIONAL NEED. LUNS COMMENTED THAT NON- NATO MEDITERRANEAN PORTS ARE INDEED SEEING SOVIET BUT NOT NATO SHIPS. HE THEN ASKED BUSCH FOR DATE FINAL NORWEGIAN DECISION CAN BE EXPECTED, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT BUSCH WOULD POINT OUT NEAR UNANIMITY OF DPC.

8. BUSCH RESPONDED THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE US INTERVENTION AND UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. HE FULLY AGREED WITH OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN. BUT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIT WERE WORRISOME. HE THEN ATTEMPTED TO CHARACTERIZE HIS

POSITION AS ONE OF NON- ISOLATION BY SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH NORWAY WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO DRAW A NEGATIVE CONCLUSION, NORWAY' S VIEWS WERE INDEED SHARED BY OTHERS. LUNS COUNTERED THAT ALTHOUGH SOME MAY SYMPATHIZE, THEIR CONCLUSIONS ARE DIFFERENT; FOR EXAMPLE, ON BALANCE, NETHERLANDS AGREES WITH THE VISIT. BUSCH, PURSUING, SAID NORWAY WAS NOT COMPLETELY ALONE, THAT IT WAS MORE THAN JUST UNDERSTANDING FOR THE NORWEGIAN VIEW, THAT OTHERS DO SHARE NORWAY' S POSITION BUT
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JUST WEREN' T SAYING SO. LUNS SAID IT' S THE VOTE THAT COUNTS.

9. BUSCH SAID GON WOULD FIND IT NECESSARY TO CONFER WITH NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, BEFORE RESPONDING. HE SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE A FINAL ANSWER BY MAY 1.

10. TURKEY (ERALP) CHARACTERIZED THE US ARGUMENTS AS UNASSAILABLE AND WONDERED WHETHER, IN A TIME OF CRISIS, POLITICAL MISGIVINGS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO OUTWEIGH MILITARY NECESSITY.

11. LATER, ERALP ASKED IF NAC MIGHT STATE A PREFERENCE FOR PORTS (BARCELONA VS. PALMA DE MALLORCA) IF FINAL DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE. SPIERENBURG EXPRESSED CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR MALLORCA; AND NO PERMREP DISAGREED WITH HIM. RUMSFELD

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